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REAL PROPERTY
Collins v. Oxley, 897 F.2d 456
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Collins, the surface owner, brought suit against defendant,
Oxley, the holder of the oil and gas lease. Collins alleged that Oxley's
use of the surface to develop and produce oil and gas resulted in its
damage. Accordingly, Collins sought damages under the Oklahoma
Surface Damage Act (the "Act"). Oxley filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the Act did not apply to him since his leases
predated the effective date of the Act. The district court granted Oxley's
motion for summary judgment. The district court also ruled that since
Collins conveyed his land to the Oklahoma Wildlife Department
("OWD"), he could no longer maintain an action against Oxley. Collins
subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in
part. First, the court ruled that under Oklahoma law, as it existed before
the Act, the holder of an oil and gas lease only had an implied right to
enter onto the surface and conduct drilling operations. The owner,
however, did not have an implied right to be free of liability to the sur-
face owner. Accordingly, the court ruled that Oxley did not have a
vested right to drill without liability on Collins's land. Moreover, sum-
mary judgment for Oxley on the ground that OWD was the real party in
interest, was improper. The court reasoned that Collins was the record
owner of the land when the wells were drilled and the damage incurred.
Also, he was the record owner when the litigation was instituted.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendants, the Heimanns, executed three carbon dioxide ("C02")
and mineral leases with plaintiff, Amoco Production Company
("Amoco"), between 1971 and 1974. Each lease contained a "unitiza-
tion clause" granting Amoco the right to unitize the Heimanns' mineral
interests with other lands, subject to approval by "any government au-
thority." In return, the Heimanns received a one-eighth royalty on the
net proceeds from all oil, gas, and C02 produced on their lands.
Amoco subsequently proposed to unitize the mineral rights to approxi-
mately 1.2 million acres, including the Heimanns' land (the "Bravo
Dome Unit"). This proposal allocated royalties on the basis of surface
acreage. The New Mexico Oil Conversation Commission ("OCC") ap-
proved the Bravo Dome Unit, finding that approval would prevent waste
and protect the landowners' correlative rights. The state district court
and supreme court affirmed the OCC. In 1984, Amoco filed suit in fed-
eral district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it properly unit-
ized the interests covered by the leases. The Heimanns counterclaimed,
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alleging, inter alia, allocation of royalties. The jury awarded the
Heimanns $4 million on the royalty allocation claim. Furthermore, the
court held that Amoco violated its duty of good faith and declared the
unitization of the Heimanns' land void.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the OCC's approval of the
unitization made it unnecessary for the district court to consider the
lessee's good faith and precluded the Heimanns' challenge of the royalty
allocation formula. The OCC is a regulatory agency whose function is
similar to that of a trial court. Thus, when it approved the Bravo Dome
unitization plan, it acted in a judicial capacity, and in federal court its
decision is given the same preclusive effect as it would be given in New
Mexico courts. Because the fairness issue was already litigated by the
same parties in state courts, the Heimanns were collaterally estopped
from challenging the participation formula again in federal court.
Stichting Mayflower Recreational Funds v. Newpark Resources Inc., 903 F.2d
741
Author: Judge Brown
The district court dismissed plaintiff's, Stichting Mayflower Recrea-
tional Funds ("Stichting"), claim for slander of title. The district court
also quieted title to the disputed parcel in favor of Stichting, but forced
Stichting to reimburse defendant, Newpark Resources Incorporated
("Newpark"), for expenses it incurred regarding the property. The dis-
trict court then determined the parties' rights under a 1975 mining lease
and awarded both sides attorney's fees. Stichting argued that the dis-
trict court erred in: (1) requiring Stichting to pay Newpark on the quiet
title claim; (2) misconstruing the language of the mining lease; and
(3) not allowing Stichting to amend its complaint to allege a claim for
abuse of process. Also, both parties appealed the award of attorney's
fees.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
First, the court found that the record did not clearly establish that
Newpark was lawfully entitled to the entire parcel. Newpark had an eq-
uitable interest in the property even though a third party held the record
title to the parcel. The district court did not abuse its discretion in fash-
ioning an appropriate equitable remedy under the circumstances. Sec-
ond, the court reversed and remanded the district court's interpretation
of the 1975 mining lease. The lease allowed the lessor to determine
whether a proposed mining activity "would" or "might" interfere with
the lessor's actual or contemplated use of the surface. The court held
that it must be presumed that the parties of the lease knew the effect of
the words chosen and intended those words to have their ordinary
meaning. The district court's judgment allowed mining activities that
might interfere with Stichting's contemplated use of the property.
Third, the court reversed the award of attorney's fees. The 1975 mining
lease provided that the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney's
fees. Since the district court found that neither party was the prevailing
[Vol. 68:4
1991] REAL PROPERTY 729
party, attorney's fees should not be awarded. Finally, the court held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stichting's re-
quest to amend its complaint.

